

## **"The paradoxes of jouissance – the masochism's economy as a problem for the ethics of psychoanalysis".**

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I begin this work with an affirmation and a question. The universe of lack, or gap if you prefer, may not be viewed from the perspective of morbidity. Would it be a touch on this over what Freud discuss of the turn towards the superego in "Humor", a text from 1927?

I approach this issue situating the development of neurosis at the point of the destructive pulse of the death drive, which can introduce the subject at their most primitive masochism.

The ethical dimension of psychoanalysis promises to place the subject, on this path, on the lookout for something that can present itself as an impasse, a tearing. And that, perforce, we should not avert our eyes, but look to see what we produce there, in this field, where Sade gives us the direction, which is the field of the neighbor.

What Sade, Kant and some neurotics like Emmy Von N. can present us at this precise point, where Lacan insists we direct our gaze? There, where we may encounter with many things, such as: Bangs; crashes; maxims evoked in front of the plasticity of a painting of a scene lived in everyday life; the repetition in the death pulse and many more other things, we can say about them is that they are nothing more than moral imperatives.

What difference can be presented to the subject in the transition from the primary masochism pulse, if the death pulse unfolds and reappears as a pulse as such, distinguishing itself from the tendency, when entering into its grammar?

When Lacan says that we do not surpass Descartes, Kant, Marx, Hegel, just as we do not surpass Freud, he refer us to certain works. These works that marked, in the direction of a research, a true orientation, where there is an attempt to articulate the foundation of an experience, where we move in its inside, we move, there, in the text.

It is true that they did not say everything, but what they said situates a certain point on the path of what in history is datable.

Marx, without surpassing Hegel, distinguishes himself from him by situating the impossibility of harmony between reason and necessity. But, still, Marx aspires to a state where human emancipation will not only be political but really produced. However, we have not achieved the realization of man, as Marx supposed.

Freud is not Marxist and does not go beyond him, but shows that the reason and necessity are insufficient to allow the appreciation of human realization in his field.

In the structure of the subject of language there are edges: difficulties in the function of desire. Therefore, to situate the reasons of needs playing, reason and necessity only in a second moment can be apprehended in the field of unconscious

Ernest Jones is the one who was able to better situate the neurotic in the analysis experience as a prey of hatred, the guilt and fear as moral alibi. He named this situation as compliance of the moral demand in accommodating, subjecting oneself to the interdict and escaping castration.

Emmy Von N., who does not get to articulate in her guilt feeling at the level of the death pulse, for abandoning this direction, inform us about the return, within herself; she, the prey of her own care to protect her daughters inheritance: the one who does not marry to avoid risking this inheritance “stay quiet!”, when the time comes to pass on to her daughters what belongs to them – the father’s inheritance.

“Stay quiet!” is an imperative, a maxim; and, commanding the maxim, the subject disappears and the maxim reigns.

In Seminar 2, the Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, and in 7, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan, at certain point, turns himself to the superego, before the decline of Oedipus, which Melanie Klein says is a superego arising in retorsion to the sadistic pulses.

Why does Lacan insist on reminding of this “superego”? What relation does this point on which the primary masochistic pulse rests, the imperative commands of jouissance, has to do with the superego?

Lacan tell us to stick to the Oedipal superego, which the subject incorporates as an instance. We incorporate the father as we incorporate an object. It is about the mourning of Oedipus at the origin of the superego.

When Freud works with the fantasy, “beating a child”, he insists that in its three phases there are transformations due to something, such as the premonition of what are later the normal and final sexual objectives that govern the child’s libidinal tendencies. A form of primary fantasy, which moves through real pulses, sadism and masochism.

Extracted in 1919 the entire base of the fantasy, he takes it in girls, and there Freud finds himself Lacanian in his logical demand to object  $\alpha$ . And it is to be considered rigorously that one cannot call what is done as psychoanalysis if it is not articulated, in the analysis of the subject experience, these fantasies.

Lars von Trier, in Nymphomaniac, shows in his analytical geniality that it is not that the nymphomaniac’s mother is “insensitive and slut”; it is her the nymphomaniac who by the significant instance, perhaps of the superego, whom finds herself under the determination “insensitive and slut”.

This point of the subject’s experience is linked to various Works and at different levels.

It’s the imperatives as categorical, the imperatives of jouissance, the paradoxes of the jouissance and the paradoxes of desire that support as a significant law to the subject in their guilt, their hatred or fear.

The problem of each men’s current relationship between his birth and death with his own desire, on a universal plane, is not resolved.

In this boundary region, the intermediate zone between the two deaths, the subject, alone and betrayed, advances through the derisive or tragic path. It is in the drama that Oedipus shows the limit of his relationship with the desire. It is because in all human experience this relation with desire is always repelled to beyond death, to not take risk to death.

The castrating father is not the father who interdicts. The superego, in its turn, is an economy; it becomes as more demanding as more sacrifices are made to it. If the paths to jouissance have, themselves, something that is the interdiction that serves as their utilitarian vehicle, a man, without knowing what to do, falls into the routine of a short and ridiculed satisfaction.

We depend on the narrow knot of desire with the law.

The castration is on the horizon that is never produced anywhere. It is a turning point at which the subject realizes there is no father other than a dead father.

The only function of the father is to be the myth of the Name of the Father and the function of the signifier in the subject's access to his relation with death.

It is always through a surpassing of the limit that man makes an experience of his desire. Here there is nothing more but the true and invisible disappearance of what is his.

There is the entrance into zone constituted by the renunciation of goods and power, a punishment that is not a punishment, which is a topology, a tragic topology.

The beginning though neuroses are the interiorization of the law by the instance of the superego, but the superego is not the law, the desire is the law. The superego has nothing to do with moral consciousness.

It is Kant who sets the topological framework that distinguishes the field of moral judgment: It is necessary that we are not by anyway interested in anything at all for it to be the field that can be valued as ethical.

If traditional morality was based on what should be done to the extent possible, it is also in it that its pivotal point must be unmasked, where it is situated, which is nothing more than the impossible, where the topology of desire is recognized.

It is Kant who gives us the transposition, when he states that moral imperative does not preoccupy with what can or cannot be done. This is the very testimony of obligation for obligation's sake, the necessity of a practical reason.

This field acquires its importance through the emptiness that is left by the Kantian definition, and we, as analysts, recognize this place as occupied by desire.

It is through the overturning of our experience that an immeasurable measure is situated at the center, a desire that is lacking.

In Kant, at this crucial point, we also see where the horizon of practical reason opens up: for the respect and the admiration inspired by the starry sky above us and the moral law within us.

This respect and admiration for the starry skies were already fragile, We see what we have fallen into capitalism with so much bright.

But then, what does it mean that they still persists in Kant? It is because we can go there and look if there is no one to constitute a presence. There is no other articulable sense to this divine presence, except the sense that serves us as a criterion for the subject in the significant dimension.

We philosophers, this being, its acts and knowledge are conflated. The religious tradition is not mistaken; It is what is articulated in a revelation that has the right to the recognition by one or several divine persons.

For us analysts, the heavens could be inhabited by a transcendent person, but that it appears, there, a sign, a message, something that says that is occurring a reality.

Kant can reduce the essence of the moral field to its purity, but in its central point remains that is necessary to have a place for accounting. This is the meaning of the horizon of the immortality of the soul.

The topology of the between-two-deaths proposes that the only thing that one can be guilty of, from an analytical perspective, is to have given up their desire. There is no other good other than one that can serve to pay the price for access to desire, if we define this desire as the metonymy of the subject being.

The stream in which desire is situated is not just the significant chain, but what flows underneath: what we are and also what we are not, our being and our non-being.

In the religious operation, what is sacrificed from good to desire is what is lost from desire to good. This pound of flesh is which religions performs its duty's and apply itself in recover. This is what distinguishes the religious work of catharsis of ethical nature that brings apparently unrelated things together, the psychoanalysis and the tragic spectacle of the Greeks,

Catharsis in the sense of purification of desire. But psychoanalysis, this field that is ours, the object of a science, is the science of desire.

In 1927, in his text "Humor". Freud is led to suppose that a pre-conscious thought is delivered, for a moment, to unconscious review. A joke is the contribution made to comedy by the unconscious. In exactly the same way, humor would be the contribution made to comedy by the intervention of the superego.

We know the superego as a severe lord. We can say that it does not match with such character the fact of the superego condescends to capacitate the ego to obtain productions of pleasure. If it tries, through humor, to console the ego and protect it from suffering, this does not contradict its origin in the paternal agent. Freud continues: if it is really the superego, that, in humor, speaks this kindness to the intimidated ego, this will teach us that we still have much to learn about its nature articulated to the unconscious.