

M^a José Muñoz

ETHICS AND LOGIC OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

When we speak about ethics we speak about a practice. That is why Lacan, in his writing "Kant with Sade", analyzes Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* (CPR) and its categorical Imperative, which is opposed, even being of the same order as the Sadean one. But this Kantian practice already has its origin in a theory in which there is a radical division between what would be pure reason, and therefore categorizable and universalizable, and what remains outside, the pathological and the desire. It is the compliment to his transcendental subject of conceptual basis. Lacan, facing it, and relying on the revisions of different logicians, from his Seminar *The Identification* (1962), will rescue everything that Kant rejects and will embark on a new form of logical-topological foundation of the subject of psychoanalysis. The reason after Freud, based on another reading and another writing. Kantian transcendental subject versus the subject of psychoanalysis.

For this task Lacan will rely on the objections that other authors, within philosophy and logic, had been raising to the Kantian doctrine. In the first place, and at this general level, Charles S. Peirce will oppose the difference between pure reason/practical reason. For him, any type of inference produced by humans must be considered as reason, even if it has an illusory or fictitious origin. His logic will start from the Existent, as opposed to the Aristotelian and Kantian Universal. Also, his *Aesthetics* (space and time), still based on Kantian schemes, articulating the intelligible with the sensible, lead him to propose a topical geometry (topology) with the continuous/discontinuous pair, until he arrives at his "graphs or existential schemes". In them Peirce draws, on a flat surface (a perforated sphere) all the classical logic of classes, predicates and propositions. They are circles that articulate with each other, cutting and adding different statements and syllogisms. It is here that Lacan claims to find his famous

inner eight, and from where he gathers both forms of topical writing, the Kantian - let us recall his schematics of the optical apparatus - but also the Peircian with its closed cuts. The difference will be that he will add cuts and gluing on closed topological surfaces such as the cross-cap, which go out of the spherical/flat. We then find ourselves in a continuity/discontinuity of the signifier in which sequential cuts and the relations between them will be necessary.

It is in this sense that Lacan will continue to rely on Peirce, Boole and Frege, as opposed to Aristotle and Kant. Peirce's logic is a logic of relations. I will not go into all that can be deduced from his famous circle, extensively commented on in its syntax and semantics by Lacan, and I will point out two of its central aspects in that seminar. For S. Peirce, any predicate of the type "All strokes are vertical" are nothing but relations between propositions that link, in different ways, two different concepts, the one that acts as subject (strokes) and the one that acts as attribute or predicate (verticals). Each of them must be verified. This perspective breaks and atomizes the pretended Unity-Identity of the Aristotelian categorical statements in a double axis, that one where now the Subject and the Predicate are separate elements, distinct and connected between them as any two propositions; but also, and as a consequence of the above, that one of the axis of the Kantian transcendental Subject-object articulation, as far as when the propositions are syntactically composed between them, either we find the concept corresponding to the subject annulled, or that of the object of the initial predicate. In both cases, and at the semantic or extensional level, it is the empty quadrant that verifies them. The nullification. But also, if we put them together, they would contaminate each other, subtracting identity. It is the famous phrase "All that glitters is not gold" from which Lacan deduces that their intersection robs gold of its brilliance and concludes that the Logic Classical Canonical (I would add ancient) is the logic of Privation. Along the way, the Alterity or function of the object has disappeared.

As we can see, we are talking about places. Enunciative places where logic and topology go hand in hand. To the axis continuity/discontinuity, reading and writing, we must add the one of temporality or temporalities. As opposed to the need of the presence of the object of sensible intuition, or of the absolute space within which phenomena are produced according to Kant. Lacan picks up, on the one hand, that of the reiteration that articulates desire and Demand. But also that time of alternation and structural pulsation between the signifying dimension of "representation" of a subject and what falls as remainder. In the first case a cut in the intrinsic is operated in the cross-cap, which I will call Boolean as it obeys the dialectic of the algebra of Boolean logic ($a^2=a$; $+a=-a$, $2a=0$), corresponding to the mathematics of the phantasm $\$ \diamond a$. A Moebius Band and a bilaterian disk that emerge from the Moebian path and where Lacan situates that moment of subjective destitution in the attempt to trap a signifier for a signifying other, which throws the subject out of the circuit. A phantasmal circuit that feeds back, that does not cease to be full of intermediate and intermediary stops and inferences, in which we find a reduced and invariant structure, both general, as in the phantasm of "He beats a child", or those of paranoia "he hates me"; as well as in the case by case being able to clear one's own frame. It is these intermediate stages where the subject enunciatively changes and combines places where logic and topology fulfill their function.

It is not strange, then, that Lacan in his next seminar, *The Anguish*, offers us two matrices of division, one of the Subject and the other of the Other which, having the same elements, are going to be different. Different places and times also when he uses Euler's circles to establish his formulas of alienation and separation. Then we can find the logic of the phantasm worked as two logical-algebraic semigroups (Klein's semigroups); the tetrahedrons of discourses, etc.

. But it will not be until ... *Ou pire*, empty place or place of emptiness, that Lacan will make a second return to the Aristotelian prosdorisms [categories], with their

corresponding quantors. Only this time, and much more situated in everything developed by First Order Logic and its conditions of truth and extensionality, he will start from non-existence, but also from overdetermination. An inexistence that begins deduced from the difficulty encountered by Frege in accounting for the correspondence between numbers, beginning with zero, being equal to and different from itself, would subsume the number zero. But it is also the movement that drags with it that very impossibility in the series. The zero, the one and the two, impossible to catch. No doubt this will be one of the ways of grounding the *Non rapport sexuel* and its formulas of sexuation, but Lacan will use a few more logical-mathematical formulas: Pascal's triangle, Cantor's transfinities, that subtle difference between the not-that and the not-that; the articulation between the need of starting from a discourse and its "out of discourse", and that play between the intrinsic/extrinsic of the systems of logic, which he also shares with topology and which Lacan will articulate in the combinatorics between knots (extrinsic) and closed surfaces (intrinsic) in his last seminars.

In conclusion, this very brief tour through Lacan is nothing but an appeal to give reasons, which, being mathematics, allow us to share with other disciplines, but also to give reasons to the answers that are always anticipated in the changing times in which we live.