

The validity of the ethics of psychoanalysis: The subject shall be.

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Jacques Lacan, in his Seminar on ethics, considers that taking into account the ethics of psychoanalysis involves talking about lack, and wonders if it is the same lack that Freud referred to regarding the murder of the father, a myth that the Viennese master located at the origin of the development of culture, but at the same time, Lacan wonders whether this lack is the one belonging to founding times that entails the death drive. Lacan questions those analysts who, working through the patient's desire, believe that its aim should be to achieve the harmony of the subject, appease guilt, and domesticate enjoyment. He argues that it is about clarifying the *Wo es war, soll ich werden* (where id was, there the subject shall be, not the Ego).¹

On the egoic level, analytic ideals abound: the first one is the ideal of human love, which leads to the so-called genitalization of desire, a kind of hygiene of love; the second ideal that obstructs analytic work is that of authenticity, seen as a continuous scale towards progress, and the third ideal is that of non-dependence, which implies that the analyst educates and influences the character formation of the analysand.

Contrary to the accepted belief, Lacan argues that the opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality principle belongs more to the properly ethical experience than to psychology.

The deviations committed by certain psychoanalyses serve to transform these obstacles into buoys that guide our route.

Lacan's merit in this Seminar VII is to reclaim the clinical implication, addressing what Freud worked on in the *Project of a Psychology for Neurologists*; it is about The Thing, das Ding, the starting point, logically and chronologically, of the organization of the world in the psyche.

¹ cf. Jacques Lacan. *La ética del psicoanálisis: Seminario VII (1959-1960)* Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1988. Class N. 1 (November 18th 1959) pages 9-25.

Das Ding, a veiled, incestuous unity that marks the necessary prohibition of incest, unrepresentable, extimate, absent.

And if, just like Lacan defines it, as what from the real suffers the signifier, the praxis of the analyst, inseparable from his ethics, will indicate to him that the symptom, being made of significant stuff, lies, but paradoxically reveals the truth of an enjoyment.

In Freud's work, there are several references to the matter of truth. In his text "*The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious*," he speaks about the skeptical joke.

"In a Galician railway station, two Jews meet in the train carriage. 'Where are you travelling to?' asks one. 'To Krakow,' comes the response. 'But what a liar you are!' the other angrily retorts. 'When you say you're travelling to Krakow, you want me to believe you're travelling to Lemberg. But I know very well that you're really travelling to Krakow. So why do you lie?'"²

This means that the field of enjoyment - which is real - can only be approached through the deceptive mediation of the signifier.

Following the direction of the cure, the analyst - guided by the discourse of the analysand - occupies the place of the semblance: it is in Seminar XVIII, *On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance*, that Lacan uses a neologism: "s'emblem" (which means "to precipitate") and "s'emblant" (semblance), meaning that the analyst's position as "semblance" implies a precipitating function of a truth; it should be said that both the "semblance" and the "presence of the analyst" are functions of the so-called "analyst's desire".

The symptom represents the return of truth in the absence of a knowledge, and in its variety (as referred to by Lacan in Seminar XXIV, *L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile á mourre*) it is the way in which the unconscious - structured as a language - can emerge in its dimension of truth: lapsus, dreams, failures, stumbles, fissures, etc.

² Sigmund Freud. *El chiste y su relación con lo inconsciente*. In: *Obras completas de Sigmund Freud*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 2001. Volume VIII. page 108.

Truth is a discursive place in the course of an analysis, the analysand confronts it, positioning himself as responsible for his enjoyment: when the analyst reads, he writes at the same time, and in that analytical act, he manages to unite both truth and knowledge.

In the aforementioned Seminar XXIV, Lacan asserts that the only knowledge is that of *lalangue*, that is, one's own language in motion, it is the subjectivation of the particular language, it is a living language. Let us clarify the following: the validity of ethics in psychoanalysis today, when working with the notion of *lalangue*, does not in any way mean making the manifestations of the unconscious obsolete, on the contrary, the unconscious is a *savoir-faire* with *lalangue* and, if the aim of psychoanalysis - within the current civilization discontent – keeps on bringing forth the subject of the unconscious, the rupture of the semblance is a propitious field for eroding the signifiers, disarticulating the coagulated senses of the analysand so that he can find his singular speech, his S_1 , rewriting his history in transference.

The analyst, in his learned ignorance, will not go beyond his patient's association, the proper operation of analysis is to achieve the opening of the symbolic cord to infinity, with his act he makes a connection between the symptom and the parasitic real of the analysand's enjoyment.

Lacan asks himself: Does truth awaken or numb? He answers: It depends on the tone in which it is spoken.

Lacan makes a proposal: "The only thing oneself can be guilty of - in the analytical perspective - is having given in to one's desire," doing things for the sake of the other does not protect us from neurosis.

There is no other sake than that which can serve to pay the price of access to desire, which is defined as the metonymy of our being. Anyway - says Lacan - you can sublimate everything you want, you have to pay for it with something, that something is called "enjoyment", that operation is paid for with a pound of flesh...

I conclude with Lacan's words: "(...) throughout this historical period, the desire of man extensively probed, anesthetized, put to sleep by the moralists, domesticated by the

educators, betrayed by the academies, took refuge, simply repressed itself, in the subtlest and also the blindest passion, as shows us the story of Oedipus, the passion for knowledge."

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³ Jacques Lacan. *La ética del psicoanálisis: Seminario VII (1959-1960)* Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1988. Class N. 24 (July 6th 1960) pages 370-387.