

## **Work group:**

**The instance of the letter. Have we arrived at "Lacan's Station"? No, we arrived at "Freud's Station"!**

**Dialogues in an *in-between*. [1]**

### **Station # 1: Sidnei Goldberg (APPOA)**

"A train arrives at the station. In a cabin a boy and a girl, brother and sister [...] Look!!! says the brother, we have arrived in Women!; Imbecile! replies the sister, can't you see that we are in Men?"

The themes of identity and identifications are present in Freud's and Lacan's theories from the very beginning of each. There is a double movement in the sense of demonstrating the constitution of the I on the one hand and on the other hand the process of dislodging this instance, the I, from the place of lordship in its own house as Freud tells us referring to the narcissistic wound caused by psychoanalysis and its invention of the Ics.

Lacan begins his seminar on the theme of Identification by calling attention to the fact that in this operation what we think of first is the other to whom we identify.

- Identify yourself to the doorman. An ambiguous imperative for a psychoanalyst or a poet, but which aims to operate a segregation of classes through gates. - My name is Jane Doe, I'm here to visit Sicrana in apartment 42. - Are you here to make a delivery? Delivery is at the next door, says the doorman through the intercom, from his armored cabin. - I came to deliver to myself, I'm a friend of Sicrana's, answers between aggressive and debauched the one who wants to enter through the non-servant's gate.

It is always with another that we can identify ourselves. Idem is the radical present in the words: identity and identification. Lacan

points out this Latin radical that refers to the notion of equality already in the beginning of the mentioned seminar.

This other to whom we can identify ourselves can appear under countless aspects and can acquire different functions in people's lives. We can identify ourselves to an image, as it usually happens with babies in the operation baptized by Lacan as the mirror stage. We can identify ourselves with names, surnames - before World War II, in Nazi Germany Jewish men and women were forced to add the names Israel or Sara to their baptismal names; disobedience of this rule implied death. We can identify ourselves or be identified by skin color tones, by gender, by way of mockery, by religious and political preferences, and as many other traits as we can imagine. One major difference that we can establish in this process is the use of the differentiating trait. Its use in the state of sign or in the state of signifier produces the difference between an alienating crystallization and propitious to segregation, or a creative and potentially propulsive property. Lacan points out this possibility of the traces, and specifically of the trace called unary, to pass from one state to the other in his seminar dedicated to the theme of Anguish.

From an important anti-segregationist movement we have arrived in the current historical moment at a cipher: LGBTQIAP+. What is the position that psychoanalysts have to take in front of this range of possibilities of identifying traits? Before risking some kind of answer, it is worth remembering. It was Freud who pointed out in his text *The Impulsions and Their Fates* (1915), referring to the object of impulsions, that for any human being the normal is always the accidental. That the norm is that objects found in a contingent way produce satisfactions. The connections that we - human, speaking - establish with the objects that cause our desire are denormalized connections, and this is the normal. From this casual encounter fixations happen. This is perhaps the main point brought by Freud to the question of sexuality. As for the question of genders, although he did not use this terminology, he pointed out that masculine and feminine are oppositions that do not figure

in the unconscious. In the unconscious the opposition that precedes this is between active and passive and between castrated and uncastrated (possibilities of discursive-logical places for any speaker, Lacan will advance from these Freudian points).

In the seminar *Les non-dupes errent*, Lacan, following up on that initial train ride, will reiterate that man and woman are only signifiers and that, therefore, to become a man or a woman it would be necessary to authorize oneself, from oneself and from some others, in the same way as to become an analyst.

After having referred to the dichotomy between the state of sign and the state of signifier, he went on to speak of identifications propitiating identities in terms of bundle, bouquet or swarm of signifiers.

To this extent it seems clear that it is not up to the analysts to legislate, censure, nor to indicate any type of regulation regarding the identity choices that the speaking beings may invent throughout time. What is perhaps up to us, consonant with our ethics, is to salute the symbol + of the referred cipher. Because its presence functions in this case in an analogous way to the object a invented by Lacan in its functioning in the analytic discourse. This symbol + reminds each one of the letters that precede it that no list of identity possibilities will ever be exhaustive, either at the existential level, or at the level of the jouissance exercises and that the fixations are in fact fictions; and that all movement and novelty will be welcome and are already foreseen precisely because of the presence of this symbol that points to the one more. Like *Sherazade's A Thousand Nights and One More*.

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## Station # 2: María Teresita Pullol- Silvia Cabrera- Karina Rotblat

Resonating so much in everyday clinical listening, bringing us to this convergence that asks us about ethics today, we question, why, in the field of psychoanalysis, are identity and identification confronted, establishing a versus between both signifiers?

As psychoanalysts, we work with identification, the name with which Jacques Lacan titled his teaching for a year, but we also hear in the clinic what insists from identity.

Knowing that identity coagulates and fixes from the imaginary plane, and that we refer to the symbolic when speaking of the process and movement of identification, a question that arises from listening today is: how to move from one signifier to the other without leading us to contention or censorship of concepts in our field?

What is on either side of the established versus?

The word identity, since the classical philosophers, had a single meaning, that of its Latin etymological root *identitas*, that means, "equal to oneself" or even "being oneself," or what is known as the ontological principle of identity ( $A=A$ ) "The word "identification" is formed from Latin roots and means "the action and effect of recognizing, providing data to be recognized, sharing the same beliefs." Its lexical components are: *identitas* (identity), *facere* (to make), plus the suffix *-tion* (action and effect).

Going through the field of identifications moves us away from "the dialectic of being" and into that of "having". In the first stage of the Oedipus complex, "it was enough to be the phallus," in the second, it was a matter of "to be or not to be the phallus" while in the third, the situation is that of "having the phallus." Identity is always associated with an assertion about being, but in the clinic,

we also hear how being tied to certain identities can facilitate the subject's emergence, while identification to the masses often obstructs it.

The transit through identifications involves a complexity textured by the three registers. If it is a question of the phantasy, the response to the Other's interpellation is partly coined in terms of drive *jouissance* and is marked by the partial nature of the objects of enjoyment. Identity opposes the partial, on the contrary, it pushes for inclusion in a set with aspirations towards totality. If the phantasy responds from a singular choice of enjoyment, identity does so by urging participation in a collective that brings together several subjects.

In the decline of the Name-of-the-Father, does the father of *jouissance* assume a heroic stance, urging massification, which does not enable the establishment of the subject's desire, with all subsumed in the enjoyment of a badge or slogan, sometimes with a single possible identity? How do we navigate an articulation? The singularity of the analytic practice brings in his stuff the puncturing of that identitarian fixity. How do we overcome these necessary collectives, knowing the solidarity that a certain mass movement also faces when it comes to asserting the rights of the vulnerable?

Our work, always case by case, one by one, will be to distinguish in praxis the "good and just" collective cause, and how it is intertwined with the *fantasme* so as not to be fixed in the identity of the mass, because we know that the ethics of psychoanalysis urge us not to give up on desire, a unique and singular desire that can be in "cause". If it comes hand in hand with a collective, praxis will indicate the direction of the cure, propitiatory operations that can account for subjective singularity and the object at stake in that cause. We do not forget, then, a meaning of "identity" that alludes to what by structure in the direction of the cure traces the

path of the impossible... while the identity of perception is impossible, but precisely there resides the motorization of desire.

The proposal for what resonates with identity in the clinic, that Actual that is sometimes not so much, and that summons us from the proposal of this congress, is to take that feature that arrives, ~~in order~~ to direct from that *the same* in the cure towards an *act*. If identity etymologically implies that *sameness*, and identification, also from its roots, implies the *facere* of doing, there is an implicit act in that passage, from a sameness to a doing. From the mass to the extraction of singularity, passages that we aspire not to reject prejudicially, but to propitiate a transition between sameness and an act that entails difference. An act that has the status of psychoanalytic.

Although Identification is a subjective process in which the Other is taken, incorporated in its three dimensions R, S, I. And on the other hand, Identity responds to a question regarding the Ego, in relation to the imaginary being played in that structure, we also observe, especially in our clinical practice, that this response is never completely finished, as it cannot fully encompass, even if it intends to, the entirety of the imaginary dimension of the Ego and what is compromised of the subject there.

While Identity is the result of the identificatory process by which the Ego appropriates the marks of the Other to constitute its own marks, we ask ourselves, then, if Identity can be thought of not as a finished, closed product, but as a recognition of the being that relies on a structural lack. Where the Ego cannot always respond to the being in the same way but based on the marks that come into play in each situation of life.

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### **Station # 3 : Maria Ângela Bulhões (APPOA)**

We understand that identity is a construction produced from identification. The first process of identification presented by Freud is primary identification with the father. He tells us that this is the first emotional bond with an external element. In Lacan, we are talking about the subject's constitution that occurs in differentiation with the first Other. It is the inscription of the unary trait that inaugurates the signifying chain and produces the function of guarantor to launch the object in its metonymy.

For the subject, the process of alienation in the continuity of being for the Other is always at stake, as well as the constitution of difference through identification with the trait that makes the difference. Identification with the trait participates in the constitution of a self. But a self that cannot produce the essence of its being, as it will always present itself as incomplete.

In clinical practice, we encounter cases where we hear about a certain search to establish a refoundation of the subject. A chance to start over, where the new signifier would establish the desire to produce difference. A new name, a new geographical location, a new gender, a new way of living, etc.

Thus, we can reflect that the analytical discourse proposed by Lacan inserts into its formula the production of a new signifier S1 that would be possible as a result of an analysis. Is it not at stake in an analysis to refound the subject in a less alienated way to the discourse of the Other? In the analyst's discourse, we find the divided subject, the analyst in the position of the object as the cause of desire, and the unconscious knowledge as truth coming from this division. And a new S1 as a production of this operation in the analysis.

The ways someone finds and invents to insert the new signifier will always be linked to the signifying battery that works in that history/Other's discourse. Certainly, the new signifier demands more radicality when the repetition of the same presents itself

threateningly. We know that identity can sometimes take a unique form that produces fixity but can also present itself as a constant mutation without a stopping point. These identities are imaginarily fixed or imaginarily infinite in that they are taken to give consistency to a complete self.

For the analyst, it is the process of identification that is allowing or not allowing some condition of the subject that matters. In the analysis, we will work to create movement in encounters with fixation and to create stopping points when the movement is uninterrupted. Ultimately, we will enable new identificatory processes that allow for new rearrangements. We will constitute and insert new signifiers that can make the signifier Name-of-the-Father valid in the form of Sinthome. A certain invention of the subject.

It is in the condition of speaking about their suffering that someone seeks analysis. They come to talk to us about what is moving and what is not moving in their history. What is moving and what is paralyzing. Where they believe they cannot get out of. Asking for exits, they begin to tell about their historical labyrinth. Their references, their identities, and where they see themselves only repeating. All choices to go further in the possibilities of creative life and in the production of desire go in the direction of a clinic of the subject.

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#### **STATION # 4: Elaine Starosta Foguel (APPOA)**

The past century witnessed several genocides of immense scale resulting in the deaths of millions of people. We are not talking about the wars, but about totalitarian governments that are founded on the extermination of part of their own civilian population.

This happened in Germany, Russia, China, Turkey and Rwanda, among other places. The coming to power of an initially small group that expands rapidly and turns into a fervent mass, led by a



creature fanatic for its own ideas--, results in the armed forces taking over, having everyone subjugated and perpetuating terror and genocide as a strategy to stay in power. Recently, in our country, the previous government's total disregard for the health of the Yanomami tribe decimated a large part of its population. So, we now talk about the Yanomami genocide.

As Imre Kertész has already clarified, “We have to visualize clearly: no party or totalitarian State can exist without discrimination; and the totalitarian form of discrimination, in turn, is, necessarily, genocide (KERTÉSZ, 2004 p.69)”. [1]

After the World War I, Freud began to study the psychology of the masses, that would subsequently, in a few years, manifest its lethal power. He suggests that the strong identification with a leader's *unique trait* leads the subject to abandon his initial censorship and embrace a collective way of thinking, feeling and evaluating. As with passion or as in hypnosis, the image and words of an unknown person consume the self: “(...) in the blindness of love, the lack of mercy is brought to the pitch of the crime. The total situation can be entirely summed up in a formula: the object was put in the place of the ego-ideal (Freud, p.143-144)”.

In these cases, the two other forms of neurotic identification, the love for the father and the identification with the symptom of the Other, are subsumed under the new ego-ideal that commands the *jouissance* of each one in the group of adepts, generating a continuity between the libidinal constitution of the subject and that of the group: a *unified trait* of identification with the leader that leads to a real mutation in the bonds, in the affections, in the values, in the vocabulary and in the ethics of the mass adherents.

Therefore, the phallic *jouissance*, constituted by each person, loses its edges and becomes contaminated with the death instinct, with sadism, with the perpetuation of atrocity. It is a new psychic structure that emerges, capable of words and actions that the *Polis* until then, regulated.

The fragility of the *operations of the lack* is astonishing, can be easily dismantled in the fanaticism of the violent horde. We are obliged to state that the operations that produces castration and access to the phallic order can be transient states in some subjects in civilization.

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[1]KERTÉSZ, Imre. *A língua exilada*. São Paulo: Companhia das letras, 2004.

FREUD, Sigmund. *Psicologia das massas e análise do eu*. Rio de Janeiro: Imago Editora Ltda, 1976.

## **Station # 5: Ana Virginia Nion Rizzi**

In this Working Group, we worked on some notes regarding identification and identity. The strands for thinking about the categories were through the phenomenon that transited in two directions: those that refer to the enigma of the so-called sexual identity, and those that refer to the phenomena of identity of a nation/people/mass.

Through these examples, we try to find the breaking point between one and the other, as well as possible connections; and, over and above that, the boundaries for both categories, identification, and identity. In fruitful discussions, we found threads that lead from one to the other when it came to the frames of imaginary identification to think about the phenomena of identity.

The examples worked ranged from the subjects, when we talk about sexual identity, to mass effects, when it comes to the phenomena of the nation/people.

To work on the imaginary identification, we refer to Freud (1921) in *Psychology of the masses and analysis of the ego* where we learn the three types of identifications: to the father, to the trait and to the desire of desire. These three Freudian identifications would be on the side of the constitution of the ego in its imaginary aspect.

On the side of the *I moi*, specular, rivaling, which can penetrate the sidewalks in violence, beyond the profitable narcissistic tension. Profitable, in the sense that it creates a remnant capable of provoking the cause of desire for elaboration.

When borders break down through violence to dominate, submit, extradite, and usurp the other, we are entering the persecutory and paranoid policy of exterminating what is different. Thus, we mention examples of mass effects, in dictatorial regimes identified with a certain trait of leader/father/master/lord.

When working on the possible limits of imaginary identification/identity, we allude to the real and symbolic versions of the law. We think about the possible relationships between a certain decline of the Name-of-the-Father to have mass effects with a more segregationist character.

In this way, the symbolic and real precariousness brings increasingly violent and segregationist aspects that call into question what is transmitted from the father and that makes it possible to identify with the real since the dead father.

The homogenizing attempt and the idea that it becomes universal, that is, for everyone, in its imaginary aspect as a way of marking something that would come from the Name-of-the-Father, is perhaps showing signs of a certain decline. In what sense? In the

sense that the father is the dead father to make way for lowercase versions of the father. We know that there can be versions of the parent and not "A" version of the parent. The effects of marking something different each time, it does not seem to be in a terrain where one can transit and transmute. Something perhaps appears as trying to mark with imaginary consistency that it needs to be inscribed as different, trying to settle the differences in an imaginary stratum.

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## **Station # 6: Deise Stein**

If identification is the means by which subjects become singular, identity is what allows them to acknowledge their singularity. These two notions are very close and at the same time very distant. Identifications ensure identity.

The first identification occurs in the register of the imaginary, it is narcissistic, where the "I" appears. There is also symbolic identification, which Lacan designated as the identification of the signifier. The latter is based on the unary trait, an element that is at the foundation of the symbolic chain and which refers to the unrepresentable. Without it, the other signifiers would not represent anything. In other words, the unrepresentable has the essential function of supporting the signifying chain. It is the signifier that founds the chain, the trait from which subjects can count themselves.

Identification is always partial. Identification with the trait promotes the constitution of an / that will always be incomplete because the subject identifies with others but must separate to exist. According to Soller[2], identity is the opposite of dislocation, and separation is the opposite of subjection.

By proposing the concept of unary trait, Lacan intends to signal what is radically unique about the subject, highlighting his unique place in the field of language, that through which everyone can be “one”, the foundation of the singularity mark, that at once is a sign of identity and difference [3]. What characterizes the unit of the signifier is that it is pure difference, it is constituted by opposition to the other significant elements of the chain.

Returning to the imaginary identification, it is worth mentioning the importance of the imaginary in the constitution of the subject, through the gaze of the maternal Other so that the / can constitute itself as an imago that represents a body designed by the traits of the Other’s desire. The mirror stage attests an identification - something is formed in which the baby can identify -, installing the formation of the imaginary body, giving consistency to its fragmented body, a body unified by the mirror image that gives it an attribute of completeness. It is a necessary moment in the formation of the self, without which the constitution of the subject could be irrevocably impaired.

Just as the identification with the supposedly totalizing image of the mirror in which an assimilation of a specular image occurs, any identification that seeks an identity of completeness, a closure of meaning, within an ideal of identity is imaginary.

Symbolic identification, on the other hand, makes a hole, lacks, comes as a substitute for the misleading totality of the imaginary, opening to significance, in which the subject comes from the effect of a signifier. Where the imaginary seeks a closure of meaning, the symbolic appears as an opening for meaning, where imaginary identification presupposes a permanent identity, symbolic identification is marked by successive substitution in a series of identifications [4] (Cruglak, 2001).

Identification always occurs in traits, through the connection with traits of the other. It is what captures me about the other. It's the

other's mark on me. The analysis is what makes it possible to restitch the identifications.

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## **Station 7 – Rosane Ramalho (APPOA)**

The relationship between identity and identifications is a crucial theme these days, both because of the importance it has in psychoanalytic theory and practice, and because of the impact identity movements have had on the current political-cultural scenario. The identity movements have strongly put forward not only demands for recognition, but also criticism directed at theories, institutions, fields of knowledge and practices, which have been pointed out as silent but powerful participants in the processes of oppression, exclusion or segregation of individuals and groups.

The psychoanalytic field was not immune to all this historical movement. The discussion over identities has provoked heated debates, both among psychoanalysts and militants, as well as among psychoanalysts who hold different positions regarding these movements and their consequences in the clinic level and in social life. The recent harsh discussions around the books by Elisabeth Roudinesco, *The Sovereign Self: Pitfalls of Identity Politics*, and by Paul Beatriz Preciado, *Can the Monster Speak? Report to an Academy of Psychoanalysts*, illustrate this process well.

The so-called "identity battles," - such as those engaged in the LGBTQIA+ cause and the anti-racist movement (although for some, still considered simply as mass phenomena and, therefore, totalizing) - consist of necessary processes to promote transformations in the cultural universe that enable the recognition of subject status for those who, living on the margins and in situations of erasure or segregation, have had this status denied or restricted.

Currently, we witness several anti-racist struggles, led not only by the Black movement, but also by white people who, by acknowledging their privileged position, in other words, by admitting the role of whiteness in the silent maintenance of structural racism in our culture, engage in transforming this situation, assuming their racial identity (as whites) to denounce the naturalized structure of privileges from which they historically have benefited.

The problem arises when the claim or assumption of identity gives way to the fixation of identity.

In the preface of Asad Haider's book, *Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump*, Silvio Almeida, the current Minister of Human Rights in Brazil, writes that "the 'mistake' Haider talks about is not taking identity into account in analyses of society, but analyzing it as if it were something external to the material determinations of social life." The mistake consists of losing sight of the fact that identity is a starting point for the structural transformation of society, not an end in itself.

We cannot ignore the fact that Brazil was the last Western country to abolish slavery, nor can we ignore the symbolic marks that this history has left on our culture. Everyday facts are examples of this: a group of young people going to a party and only the Black person being searched at the entrance; someone expressing fear upon encountering a Black person on a deserted street; the fact that the prison population is mostly made up of Black people; and the number of people unjustly killed by police simply because of the color of their skin. The naturalization of the true genocide of Black and poor youth in Brazil is the greatest evidence of this.

Some psychoanalysts insist on seeing struggles around identity as simple mass phenomena, while others see the fixation of an identity, also from a perspective of completeness. Of course, in certain cases, this can happen. For example, many people come to us with a crystallized identity that needs to be questioned. However, identity affirmation strategies can make something different possible: the re-signification of a negatively connoted

identity, which is no longer seen as a disqualification, but instead as having a positive value. This allows the subject, through recognition of the identifying traits of their history, to access other forms of existence in which these traits play a positive role.

By disregarding the importance of these struggles for recognition as a subject, for access to the possibility of existence in its uniqueness, wouldn't we be at the end of the day collaborating with the maintenance of segregation?

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### **Station # 8 : Eliana Betancourt (APPOA)**

We can name many transitions that occur in the search or encounters with new identities: change of name, marital status, social status, career, migration, etc... A new identity watches these transitions, trying to figure out if they will become an identification. This will only be defined throughout the process. And what happens when this transition relates to a new gender identity?

We bring as an example two names: Léa (fictitious) and Caytlin Jenner, who has chosen her own name.

What does it mean when someone announces that “there is a mistake in my body?”

Léa said in analysis, “Someone will point out some mistake in how I carry myself, and then things will not work out!”

She continues, “The other day I saw a woman singing and raising her arms up and I imagined how wonderful it would be if her arms were amputated... what a relief...”

When she had to have surgery to cut off some of the gum that grew over her teeth, she went through moments of fierce anguish as she didn't know if she had told the dentist to cut it to the right size or not.



On Léa's fourth birthday, her father made her a drawing. She had been born at noon. He drew a sun and below that sun her father wrote, "Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error," a Nietzsche quote.

A year later the father dies. It was right here that Léa positioned herself - at the end of the longest error and in eternal correction.

On *Seminar Encore*, Lacan comments on the meteoric moment of courtly love and the emergence of psychoanalysis:

"It is quite clear that this will not at all fix the relationship of man and women. This is Freud's genius. It is the funniest leap in the holy farce of history. We might perhaps, as long as it lasts, see a little flash , a little flash of something that might concern the Other in so far as it is with this that the woman has to deal with."

Could it be that this " as long as it lasts" that Lacan talks about is ending? Should we have to be aware of something of the order of transition with regard to the Other, and that maybe it no longer relates to this woman he talks about?

This transition, once again, occurs through the body.

The phenomenon of transgenderism is only possible because science accompanies the desire for free choice that subjects think they are experiencing. We are facing a moment where a new anguish stalks us - the paradox of free choice about whether I am a man or a woman.

Are we facing a new imperative?

Let's explore the case of Bruce who became Caitlyn Jenner.

Caitlyn, who not only made one of the most spectacular transitions, as she became a beautiful woman, but also lived as a man producing envy in other men. He was a handsome guy and a gold medalist at the 1976 Olympics; not in one sport, but in the decathlon.

Therefore, as she says, "I still think it's that dumb, dyslexic boy who is around here." The boy survives beneath the layers of body modifications.

At some point after the famous photos in Vanity Fair, she says, “It was the first time I saw an image of myself, of who I am. And I said ‘you know what? this will work! We’ll be fine.’”

What “we” is she talking about?

Michel Foucault says, “We demand that sex speak the truth ... and we demand that it tells us our truth, or rather, the deeply buried truth of that truth about ourselves which we think we possess in our immediate consciousness.”

What truth would transgender people be asking the body to speak about?

Let's go back to the word “possess” that Foucault used.

For Winnicott, “The transitional object is not an internal object (which is a

mental concept) - it is a possession. Yet it is not (for the infant) an external object either.”

The transitional object is the first not-me possession.

In the gender-transition process, there is an encounter with a new transitional object, or a new not-me that would possibly organize the desired position of being in the other gender.

We can always ask ourselves, along with Foucault, if it is not just a question of a possession of truth that we imagine obtaining.

What does it mean when, to correct an error, I have to change my body?

Sexuation would involve a real cut in the body.

And, importantly, as Caitlyn described, “I saw my image for the first time. Who I really am.” But she was not the only one who saw it. Like a baby in front of a mirror, she had millions of eyes that looked at her, admired her and said, “How beautiful!”

It is possible that there is a passage through the mirror and a re-adolescence (that is, a transition where I don't know who I am) in the search of a new gender identity.

Annie Leibovitz, at the end of the photo shoot with Jenner, said, “I feel like I've seen Caitlyn's making”.

She did much more than that, she was the gaze behind the camera that, like the mother in front of the mirror, narcissized the baby's body.

[1] VIII INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CONVERGENCE,  
LACANIAN MOVEMENT FOR FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS.  
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[2] *The History of Sexuality*, Michel Foucault

[3] *Playing & Reality*, D.W. Winnicott